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THE MISSOURI HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE-
1956, 1957*
W .LiIm H. BECKER**
In Missouri when two negligently inattentive (oblivious) drivers
drive their vehicles into collision, and each suffers personal injuries,
each may make a submissible case for damages under the formula of the
Missouri humanitarian rule (as distinguished from the common law
last clear chance rule)' despite the contributory negligence of each as a
matter of law.
*This Article contains a discussion of selected 1956 and 1957 Missouri court
decisions.
**Attorney, Columbia, Missouri; LL.B., University of Missouri, 1932.
1. For convenience, the common law last clear chance rule and the Missouri
humanitarian rule are summarized in the following cases:
Common Law Last Clear Chance Case No1:
Discovered Helpless Peril
The peril to plaintiff's person, property, or both results from physical
helplessness caused by plaintiff's lack of care. Defendent actually discovers
the peril in time, thereafter, with safety to himself, to avoid damage to
plaintiff by the exercise of care. This is a simple last clear chance case.
The plaintiff may recover for personal injury and property damage despite
his negligence in practically all common law jurisdictions. This result is
well settled in Missouri and not expected to be challenged; but this is not
a humanitarian negligence case.
Common Law Last Clear Chance Case No. 2:
Discoverable Helpless Peril
The facts are the same as in Case 1 except that the defendant does not
actually discover the peril, but in the exercise of care he should have dis-
covered it in time to avoid damage, by the exercise of care and with safety
to himself. As in Case 1, a majority of courts permit plaintiff to recover for
personal injury or property damage under the last clear chance rule. This
is not a humanitarian negligence case, and the rule is not expected to be
challenged.
Common Law Last Clear Chance Case No. 3:
Discovered Oblivious Peril
The peril to plaintiff's person, property or both, results from plaintiff's
negligent inattentiveness (obliviousness in Missouri judicial parlance).
Defendant (as in Case 1) actually discovers the peril in time, thereafter,
to avoid damage to plaintiff by the exercise of care. This is a last clear
chance case. It is not a humanitarian case. The rule that plaintiff may
recover seems settled in Missouri and elsewhere. There appears to be no
serious challenge to the soundness of the right of plaintiff to recover in this
case.
Under the general designation "humanitarian doctrine," the Missouri
courts have recognized all three common law last clear chance cases and
have added a fourth type of case wherein the injured party may recover
(420)
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Y
This humanitarian doctrine is "judge made" law.2
The Missouri humanitarian doctrine evolved before the modern
automobile was in general use. It had as its purpose the amelioration of
the harsh common law rule of contributory negligence. The doctrine is
stated in the language of the common law last clear chance case utilizing
its terminology and concepts of fault, degrees of care, negligence, and
proximate cause. It purports to be and is administered by the courts as
a rule of negligence and causation.3
In administering the common law last clear chance doctrine, the Mis-
souri supreme court ordinarily refers to common law last clear chance
and humanitarian doctrine cases without discrimination. 4
As much as the Missouri humanitarian rule resembles the common
law last clear chance rule, the extension of the right to recover to cases
of discoverable, oblivious peril, in this age of the automobile, involves
problems and questions which cannot arise under the common law last
clear chance rule, the comparative negligence rule, and the proportionate
fault rule.
This is true because under the common law last clear chance rule,
plaintiff and defendant cannot simultaneously make submissible cases
each against the other upon any single assumed version of the facts, but
despite his contributory negligence. This fourth type of case, which is the
unique humanitarian case is as follows:
True Humanitarian Case No. 4:
Discoverable Oblivious Peril
The injured person is in a position of imminent peril as a result of his
negligent inattentiveness (obliviousness). The injured party could extricate
himself from his peril by his own efforts, if he were aware of his peril
and used care. The defendant or party against whom claim for damages
is made does not actually discover the peril of the injured party. Neverthe-
less, in the exercise of care the party causing injury should have discovered
the peril in time thereafter with safety to himself by the use of care to
have avoided injury to the plaintiff. In other words the party causing injury
is also negligently inattentive (oblivious). The Missouri courts permit
recovery by the injured party in this case; and in this respect are more
liberal in permitting recovery than courts of other jurisdictions.
2. Perkins v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 340 Mo. 868, 102 S.W.2d 915
(1937) (en banc); McCleary, The Bases of the Humanitarian Doctrine Reexamined,
5 Mo. L. REv. 56 (1940); Schwarz, The Questionable Birth of the Humanitarian
Doctrine, 14 J. Mo. B. 28 (1958).
3. The classic statement of the formula is found in Banks v. Morris & Co., 302
Mo. 254, 264-66, 257 S.W. 482, 484 (1924) (en bane).
4. But not always. Occasionally the court recognizes the distinction as in
Wabash R.R. v. Danen Mills, 288 S.W.2d 926 (Mo. 1956) (en bane).
1958]
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1958], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol23/iss4/4
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
under the humanitarian doctrine 5 they may. At the close of 1957, these
important questions in respect to the humanitarian doctrine in Missouri
remained unsolved:
(1) When plaintiff and defendant each are guilty of humanitarian
negligence of the same quality and timing, may each recover damages
from the other for personal injuries?
(2) Is the humanitarian doctrine applicable to damage to property
not involving personal injury?6
(3) To what extent may the defendant invoke the doctrine defensive-
ly and offensively?7
(4) Is legislation necessary to solve the dilemma? 8
These uncertainties about the nature and the future of the humani-
tarian doctrine are reflected in the opinions of the supreme court in
problems involving instructions and submissibility of cases.
There are several possible solutions to the dilemma confronting the
bench and the bar of Missouri in the application of the Missouri humani-
tarian doctrine. The three most often mentioned are:
(1) Missouri should enact some statutory rule abolishing contribu-
tory negligence as a defense; 9
(2) The legislature should by statute set out the common law last
clear chance rule in some form as the law of this state and eliminate the
humanitarian doctrine; and
(3) Since the humanitarian rule is judge-made law, the problem
should be solved by the court in judicial decisions.
Attempts have been made in recent years along all three lines with-
out results. The claimants' representatives have sought to abolish con-
tributory negligence by statute. At the same time, the defendants sought
to abolish the humanitarian rule and part of the common law last clear
chance rule by statute.1 0
5. See note 1 supra, Case 4.
6. See opinion of Stone, J. in Glenn v. Offutt, 309 S.W.2d 366, 268-69 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1958).
7. See note 4 supra; George v. Allen, 245 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. 1952).
8. Sheerin v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 300 S.W.2d 483, 488 n.1 (Mo. 1957).
9. This might not provide a solution if the FELA cases are applicable. Mooney
v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 352 Mo. 245, 176 S.W.2d 605 (Mo. 1944).
10. Becker, The Missouri Supreme Court and the Humanitarian Doctrine in
the Year 1954, 20 Mo. L. Rsv. 38, 40-41 (1955).
[Vol. 23
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Both bills failed to pass, and the situation remained unchanged in
early 1958. Currently, it seems that the political power of the economic
interests involved is too weak or too evenly balanced to remedy the
situation by statute. This condition could change quickly but there is no
evidence it will.
WILSON CAsE-A NEAR MISS
In 1957, it looked as if the supreme court was going to be confronted
with a concrete case which would require it to take the final step of hold-
ing simultaneous recoveries by plaintiff and defendant permissible, or to
retreat to the common law last clear chance doctrine. The occasion was
the second appeal of the case of Wilson v. Toliver."
In this case, the plaintiff and defendant had each submitted their
cases in the trial court under the humanitarian doctrine, and the jury
had returned verdicts on the claim and counterclaim, allowing each to
recover. The trial court had offset the recoveries and entered judgment
for the difference in favor of the defendant who had the greater recovery.
Here, it seemed, was the long awaited case which would settle the nature,
and perhaps the future, of the humanitarian doctrine. But it became
unnecessary for the supreme court to answer the critical question when
the court held that the plaintiff had failed to make a submissible case.
The collision out of which Wilson v. Toliver arose, occurred at a "Y"
junction. If the collision had occurred at an intersection, or while plaintiff
and defendant were meeting on a two-way road, there would have been
no question concerning the submissibility of both cases, provided both
were negligently inattentive to the same degree.
So, in 1956 and in 1957 most of the uncertainty concerning the nature
of the humanitarian doctrine was reflected in the decisions on instructions
and submissibility of cases under different factual circumstances.
At the close of the year 1957, both the survival and the proper form
of the sole cause instruction remained in doubt and subject to change
without notice. The form of the converse instruction continued to perplex
practitioners. The submissibility of the "almost escaping case" continued
to cause difficulty. The use of the "tail" clause in a humanitarian in-
struction, advising the jury that plaintiff's and decedent's negligence was
11. 305 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. 1957).
1958]
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of no consequence became safer than it had been since Smithers v.
Barker.12 And of course, the questions of dual recovery, right to recover
for property damage, and the availability of the doctrine defensively
remained in doubt.
TE MYSTERY OF THE SOLE CAUSE INSTRUCTION
The sole cause instruction based on plaintiff's negligence has provided
one of the most active and most sensitive areas of humanitarian doctrine
law for many years. The use of the sole cause instruction in humani-
tarian cases was accepted and carefully guarded by the supreme court in
use by a line of decisions of which Shields v. Keller,13 Dilallo v, Lynch,14
and Borgstede v. Waldbauer'5 are illustrative.
In Janssens v. Thompson,16 the court very nearly exterminated the
sole cause instruction in a 4-3 decision which sustained the use of the
sole cause instruction based on plaintiff's negligence.
Despite the approval of the use of the instruction in the Janssens
case, the court has been very critical of the sufficiency of the evidence to
justify its submission, and of its tendency to mislead by injecting
antecedent contributory negligence of the plaintiff as a defense. This
critical attitude possibly stemmed from dissatisfaction with the decision
in the Janssens case, and ah underlying lack of agreement on what our
humanitarian doctrine really is.
Recently in Sheerin v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 17 division number
one, speaking bhrough Judge Hollingsworth, announced that a sole cause
instruction which mentions the plaintiff's duty to use care or which
characterized his acts or conduct as negligence will probably be held to
be prejudicially erroneous. This is a condemnation of, the sole cause
instruction based on plaintiff's negligence. What is permitted is a con-
verse instruction submitting facts which if found conflict with an element
or element of plaintiff's humanitarian case. Under this decision there
remains only the converse instruction in which negligence of plaintiff
cannot be mentioned.
12. 341 Mo. 1017, 111 S.W.2d 47 (1937).
13. 348 Mo. 326, 153 S.W.2d 60 (1941).
14. 340 Mo. 82, 101 S.W.2d 7 (1936).
15. 337 Mo. 1205, 88 S.W.2d 373 (1935) (en banc). See McCleary, The Defense
of Sole Cause in the Missouri Cases, 10 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1945).
16. 228 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. 1950) (en banc).
17. 300 S.W.2d 483, 488 n.1 (Mo. 1957).
[Vol. 23
5
Becker: Becker: Missouri Humanitarian Doctrine in the Years--1956-1957
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1958
MISSOURI HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
But as late as 1956 in Parmley v. Henks,18 division number two
approved an instruction of this type condemned in the Sheern case.
The conflict between these decisions should be resolved and the rule
stabilized by the court en banc. (The underlying stress created by our
unique humanitarian rule may prevent stabilization as it has in the past.)
A SUGGESTED SOLUTION
The author of the opinion in the Sheerin case recognized the inequit-
able operation of the humanitarian doctrine in cases where the plaintiff's
negligence is gross. In a footnote the following suggestion was made:
It is the view of many writers that application of the
doctrine of humanitarian negligence to persons in a position
of discoverable peril (against defendants chargeable with a
duty to maintain a lookout) frequently results in the unjust
award of fully compensatory damages to grossly negligent
plaintiffs from slightly negligent defendants. But so long as
we continue to apply the harsh rule that any contributory negli-
gence on the part of plaintiff, however slight, constitutes a bar to
recovery of any damages for primary negligence on the part of
defendant, however gross, the evils of the first may serve to
offset the evils of the second. Of course, two wrongs do not
make one right and the adoption of the doctrine of diminution of
damages of a plaintiff or the apportionment of damages between
counter-claimants on the basis of comparative negligence would
seem to be clearly preferable. The problem is, perhaps, legisla-
tive rather than judicial. See the articles by Mr. Laurence H.
Eldredge in the January 1957 issue and by ir. David G. Bress
in the February 1957 issue of the American Bar Association
Journal.' 9
Perhaps this is the answer. Until now the legislature has shown no
indication that it will concern itself. If the legislature does not act favor-
ably on the suggestion, should the court act?
THE PROPERTY DAMAGE QUESTION
Usually in personal injury cases applying the true humanitarian rule
property damage has been a minor element and has been ignored.
Recovery for damage to property frequently is allowed under a finding
18. 285 S.W.2d 710 (Mo. 1956).
19. 300 S.W2d at 488 n.l.
19581
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for the claimant under the humanitarian rule, as distinguished from the
common law last clear chance rule which covers property damage.
From time to time theorists speculate on the logic of a rule, proceed-
ing from a tender humanitarian regard for life and limb of human beings,
being invoked to recover compensation for inanimate property.
One of our appellate judges, of unquestioned ability, endowed with an
undoubted sense of humor comments on the problem as follows:
Defendant has not challenged and briefed, and so we do not
determine and rule, the applicability of the humanitarian
doctrine (as distinguished from the last clear chance doctrine)
in a case involving only the discoverable peril of an inamimate,
parked, unoccupied motor vehicle. However, we observe in pass-
ing that, if the humanitarian doctrine "proceeds upon the
precepts of humanity and of natural justice to the end that every
person shall exercise ordinary care for the preservation of
another after seeing him in peril or about to become imperiled"
[as averred in Dey v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 140 Mo. App.
461, 467, 120 S.W. 134, 136, confirmed in the landmark case of
Banks v. Morris & Co., 302 Mo. 254, 266, 257 S.W. 482, 484, and
reiterated in literally "scores of cases" (see Sheerin v. St. Louis
Public Service Co., Mo., 300 S.W.2d 483, 489)], and if the
doctrine "is reasoned upon precepts of humanity-that tender
regard every man must have for the life and limb of other men in
times of peace" [Krause v. Pitcairn, 350 Mo. 339, 350, 167 S.W.2d
74, 78], it would be difficult indeed for us to find room for plain-
tiff's cold, lifeless, mud-splattered pickup within the enveloping
warmth of the "Mother Hubbard," already bursting at the seams,
which our humanitarian doctrine has come to be by expansion
far beyond its original concept. Smith v. Siedhoff, Mo. (banc),
209 S.W.2d, 233, 236: * * * But, "(s) ufficient unto the day is
the evil thereof" and, leaving to those in postition to speak with
judicial finality any further consideration of whether our
humanitarian doctrine has or should become "all things to all
men" in vehicular tort actions, we pass to a determination of
whether the evidence in the instant case would permit a judg-
ment for plaintiff under the humanitarian doctrine, assuming the
applicability of that doctrine in this class of suits.20
A No-CONTACT CASE
Theoretically, it has always been possible to make a case under the
20. Glenn v. Offutt, 309 S.W.2d 366, 368-69 (Spr. Ct. App. 1958).
[Vol. 23
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humanitarian doctrine where there was no actual contact between the
vehicles or the persons involved. But the court apparently had not been
required to pass on a no-contact case until the decision in Homfeld v.
Wilcoxon.21
This case involved a near collision of two motor vehicles but no
actual contact. As the automobile driven by the plaintiff approached a
"Y" junction, the defendant saw, or could have seen, the plaintiff in
imminent peril of collision and injury with defendant's vehicle. The
defendant negligently failed to take means to avoid the impending colli-
sion. The plaintiff, who had been oblivious, became aware of the imminent
peril and extricated herself from collision and injury by evasive action.
In so doing, she ran into loose gravel and skidded into a bridge abutment.
The case was submitted on humanitarian or last clear chance negligence.
In passing upon the submissibility of the case under the humanitarian
doctrine, the supreme court made it clear that the humanitarian doctrine
could apply in a situation where there was no contact. However, the
court held the doctrine not applicable to the facts, and reversed the case
for trial on primary negligence.
This case focuses attention on whether there are any circumstances
under which a plaintiff may recover on the humanitarian doctrine when
there is no collision and the injury results from evasive action to avoid
collision. For instance, suppose the plaintiff is driving on a road along
the edge of a cliff. -A situation of imminent peril of collisibn and injury
to plaintiff arises in which the defendant is guilty of humanitarian negli-
gence. Suppose in the emergency, in an attempt to avoid the collision and
injury, the plaintiff drives over the cliff and is injured. On principle it
would seem that the plaintiff should be able to recover. The real basic
fact of the humanitarian doctrine is a situation of imminent peril of
personal injury. It is not imminent peril of collision alone. The imminent
peril of injury may involve injury either as a result of collision or of
evasive action to avoid collision. In the Homfeld case, plaintiff simply did
not really avoid the peril and injury, but simply chose the alternative of
evasive action to a collision. The evasive action did not avoid the peril
of injury which resulted from a skid in the loose gravel. The Homfeld
case was a close case, and the principles involved cannot be said to be
finally settled.
21. 304 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. 1957).
1958]
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Discussion of cases of more than ordinary interest follows:
Levin v. Caldweli22 arose out of a collision of two passenger automo-
biles in the daytime at a city street intersection controlled by conven-
tional traffic lights. The intersecting streets were The Paseo and 47th
Street in Kansas City. The Paseo consists of a north and south bound
lane divided by a parkway. The plaintif passenger made a submissible
case of primary negligence and recovered against both defendants, each
of whom claimed to have the green traffic light in his favor. The
humanitarian doctrine arose on the cross-claim of one defendant against
the other. The defendant Caldwell submitted his cross-claim against the
defendant Kotelov on humanitarian negligence hypothesized in his
primary instruction on discovered or discoverable peril. A jury verdict
against the cross-claimant was reversed because of error in the converse
humanitarian doctrine given at the request of the successful defendant.
This instruction directed a verdict in favor of the defendant Kotelov if the
peril of the cross-claiming defendant Caldwell "became apparent to the
defendant, Irwin Kotelov"'28 when the automobile driven by Kotelov was
so close that the speed could not be slackened or the automobile swerved.
In keeping with the opinion of the supreme court in Wilt v. Moody,24 the
instruction was held error because of the omission of the element of
discoverable peril. The earlier case of Sackmann v. Wells25 was expressly
overruled.
It was held that a case of discoverable helpless peril, which is a
common law last clear chance case, was made by the defendant Caldwell.
The case involves an uncommon factual situation wherein both auto-
mobiles are proceeding in opposite directions in separate lines of a divided
street, and one turns left and is driven in front of the other at an inter-
section.
Parmley v. Henks,26 decided by division number two, arose out of
the collision between a passenger automobile and a pedestrian crossing
the concrete two lane highway No. 13 south of Warrensburg in the night-
time. When struck by the right front fender of the defendant's automo-
22. 285 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. 1956).
23. Id. at 661.
24. 254 S.W.2d 15 (Mo. 1953).
25. 41 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. 1931).
26. Supra note 18.
[Vol. 23
9
Becker: Becker: Missouri Humanitarian Doctrine in the Years--1956-1957
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1958
MISSOURI HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
bile, the plaintiff was one step from a position of safety. The case was
submitted upon the humanitarian doctrine for failure to slacken or
swerve. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. On appeal, in an
opinion by Judge Barrett, the defendant's sole cause instruction and con-
verse instruction based on plaintiff's negligence were held not to be
reversibly erroneous. Defendant's evidence made a submissible issue on
sole cause. The instruction in this case does not meet the test later laid
down by division number one in Sheerin v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.,
because it uses the word "negligence" and does not fully hyphothesize the
factual situation. Until this question is settled by the court en banc, the
instruction shouia not be used as a model and may be held to be error
under different circumstances and different assignments of error.
The converse instruction complained of is not set out in the opinion.
Wabash R. R. v. Dannen Mills27 arose out of a daytime train-truck
collision at a grade crossing. The railroad sued for damage to its loco-
motive. The defendant submitted his counterclaim for personal injuries
upon humanitarian negligence. The jury found for the plaintiff railroad
on its primary negligence property claim and against the defendant on
his humanitarian counterclaim. On appeal reviewing the duties of an
engineer in a grade crossing collision case, the court, in an opinion by
Judge Hyde, held that the defendant had made a last clear chance case
under the common law rule of discovered oblivious peril. In so holding,
the court cited the Restatement of Torts,28 and pointed out that a case
was made under the last clear chance rule as distinguished from the Mis-
souri humanitarian rule. The opinion contains an exhaustive review of
the duty of the engineer to act when it becomes reasonably apparent that
the plaintiff is inattentive, and in this connection, the duty to warn and
to slacken are clearly set forth. After holding that a humanitarian case
was made by the defendant, the court held that plaintiff's principal
instruction directing a verdict on the finding of primary negligence was
in direct conflict with the defendant's instructions submitting humani-
tarian or last clear chance negligence. The case may have the appearance
of a new development in the law, because the humanitarian negligence
was asserted by the defendant on a counterclaim. This actually is of no
consequence, since it should not matter whether the party asserting the
27. 288 S.W.2d 926 (Mo. 1956) (en bane).
28. § 480 (1934).
1958]
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humanitarian claim is nominally a plaintiff or a counterclaiming
defendant. The court reversed the Kansas City Court of Appeals which
had held that no humanitarian case was made by the defendant.
Faught v. Washam2 9 arose out of a nighttime collision between
defendant's automobile and plaintiff's damaged, disabled, and unlighted
automobile resting across a bridge on U. S. Highway 35 in Macon County.
The case was submitted solely on humanitarian doctrine, and a jury
verdict for the defendant resulted. On appeal, the court in an opinion by
Judge Storckman held erroneous defendant's instruction number 5 which
told the jury that the defendant had a right to assume in absence of
notice to the contrary, that defendant's automobile would not be stopped
on the highway at nighttime without a red light on the rear visible for 500
feet and that the defendant had no duty to act until he could have seen
that the plaintiff's automobile was stopped on the highway. The court
held that this instruction was erroneous and misleading because it does
not properly state the defendant's continuous duty to keep a lookout, and
permits consideration of antecedent primary negligence of the plaintiff.
The use of language concerning defendant's "right to assume"3 0 or
defendant being "entitled to assume" 3' was criticised. Further, the in-
struction was criticised for the use in this case of the words "in the
absence of notice to the contrary '32 defendant had no duty to act. Cases
containing approved instructions using the language "entitled to assume"
in cases where the presence of the plaintiff is known, or the applicable
degree of care is different are distinguished. This case indicates that the
court is becoming increasingly critical of abstract statements of law about
what the defendant is entitled to assume, where the defendant has a duty
to keep a lookout.
Nelson v. O'Leary33 involved the striking of the plaintiff, a pedestrian,
near Broadway and Keber Street in the city of St. Louis at night. Plain-
tiff submitted his case solely upon humanitarian doctrine for failure to
swerve or to slacken and swerve.
Plaintiff was apparently intoxicated and walking in the middle of
the street between the lines of traffic when he was struck. On appeal, the
29. 291 S.W.2d 78 (Mo. 1956).
30. Id. at 81.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. 291 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. 1956).
[Vol. 23
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supreme court in an opinion by Judge Van Osdol held that a submissible
case of humanitarian negligence was made on failure to swerve and on
failure to slacken and swerve. It was further held that giving the direc-
tion that contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense in a
separate instruction was not error. The court pointed out that ordinarily
this direction may be appended to the form of a "tail" clause; and since
the instructions are read together, it is not error to give a separate instruc-
tion on the subject. The instruction given is short and clearly worded and
reads as follows:
The Court instructs the jury that if under the evidence and the
instructions of the Court you find that the defendant was negli-
gent, as submitted to you in Instruction No. II and that such
negligence of the defendant directly contributed to cause the
casualty mentioned in evidence and that plaintiff was thereby
injured, then the Court instructs you that the fact that plaintiff's
own conduct directly contributed to his own injury is no defense
in this case.34
Bank v. Koogler" arose out of a collision at the intersection of U. S.
Highways 40 and 65 at Marshall Junction between a light truck driven by
plaintiff and a passenger car driven by defendant. The plaintiff was
travelling east on U. S. Highway 40 through the intersection. The
defendant travelling south on U. S. Highway 65 into the intersection
passed a stop sign controlling south bound traffic. Plaintiff submitted his
case on primary negligence in failing to observe the stop sign and under
the humanitarian doctrine, the failure to stop, slacken the speed, and to
swerve. The defendant submitted his counterclaim under the humani-
tarian doctrine. Plaintiff's primary negligence instructions did not make
reference to defendant's humanitarian instructions on the counterclaim,
but did require a finding that the plaintiff was exercising the highest
degree of care in the operation of his vehicle. On appeal, the supreme
court in an opinion by Judge Stockard held that the instructions were not
in conflict, since the plaintiff in his primary negligence instruction
required the finding that he was exercising the highest degree of care,
thereby eliminating any conflict in the instructions. The case of Wabash
R. R. v. Dannen Mills is distinguished. The court also held upon estab-
lished principles that a submissible humanitarian case was made by the
plaintiff.
34. Id. at 148.
35. 291 S.W:2d 883 (Mo. 1956).
19581
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Williams v. Ricklemann86 was an action by a nine year old pedes-
trian struck by defendant's automobile while crossing a city street in
the daytime. The case was submitted on the humanitarian doctrine for
failure to slacken or to swerve. The court refused to submit failure to
give timely warning under the humanitarian doctrine. The verdict and
judgment for the defendant was reversed by the supreme court in an
opinion by Judge Storckman. This is a classic humanitarian case where
a plaintiff is in peril because of her obliviousness of the approach of
defendant's vehicle. The defendant was negligently inattentive. The
evidence made a submissible case of ability of the defendant in the
exercise of the highest degree of care to have avoided striking plaintiff
by stopping, slackening, swerving, or giving warning of his approach.
The court made a careful calculation from the record of speed, stopping
distance, and visibility, and upon the physical circumstances found that
the defendant had ample time to avoid injuring plaintiff after her peril
became discoverable in the exercise of care. This case should be compared
with Vietmeier v. Voss,37 in which the time interval after peril arose was
too short to avoid the injury.
Williams v. Ricklemann, is the type of case in which there is natural
sympathy for the plaintiff's claim for recovery, upon which advocates
of our humanitarian doctrine base their claims for its continuance. It
is argued that the case would not be submissible under common law last
clear chance principles in the absence of the humanitarian doctrine, but
it is not clear that this case would fail of subrmission on primary negli-
gence. In fact, it is reasonable to believe that the court would hold this
nine year old child not be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law (since a bus driver gave her the signal to cross the street).
Therefore, the case was probably submissible on defendant's primary
negligence.
Peterson v. Tiona,8 8 was an action for wrongful death of plaintiff's
fifteen year old son killed t night on U. S. Highway 71 while riding an
unlighted motorcycle. The defendant's passenger automobile was over-
taking the motorcycle and ran into it from the rear. There was no expert
evidence of the distance in which defendant could stop; and there was
no expert evidence concerning the visibility created by defendant's
36. 292 S.W.2d 276 (Mo. 1956).
37. 246 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1952).
38. 292 S.W.2d 581 (Mo. 1956).
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headlights. While the motorcycle was unlighted, there were two red
reflectors and one green one suspended from the seat which were
visible from the rear. In an opinion by Judge Coil, the court held that a
subnissible humanitarian case was made for failure to stop, to slacken,
and to swerve. The deficiency in expert testimony on stopping distance
was supplied by evidence concerning the distance at which the stop was
actually made from the time the defendant discovered the decedent in
peril. The deficiency in expert testimony concerning the visibility created
by the defendant's headlights was supplied by the presumption that the
headlights met the requirements of the Missouri statute requiring that
the upper beam of automobile headlamps should reveal persons and
vehicles at a distance of 350 feet. In this case, plaintiff's principal instruc-
tion contained the "tail" directing the jury that plaintiff's contributory
negligence is no defense. The court held that it was not error to give a
principal instruction containing the "tail" clause because, first, the
defendant did not submit a sole cause instruction; and second, the clause
is not error in every case where sole cause is properly submitted.
Stephens v. Thompson3 9 was an action for wrongful death of plain-
tiff's husband who was instantly killed in a daytime grade crossing
collision when the car he was driving was struck by defendant's freight
train. The plaintiff attempted to make a case upon the depositions of
the four members of the train crew. Both the trial court and the supreme
court, in an opinion by Judge Holman, held that no submissible case
was made. A very unusual fact situation was involved. As the train
approached the crossing, members of the train crew saw the decedent
approach the crossing, stop his automobile, then proceed forward with
ample time to pass over the crossing in safety. Thereafter, the decedent's
car stalled in the center of the track. The decedent tinkered with the
automobile, then got out of the car and had started off the track when
the collision occurred. Applying established principles, the court held
that the deceased was not in imminent peril until the car stalled. There
was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant could thereafter
have avoided the collision. This was a difficult type of case for the
plaintiff, where, because of the death of the driver, the plaintiff was
required to rely upon defendant's employees to make a case.
39. 293 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. 1956).
19581
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Silverstein v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.40 was an action for wrongful
death by the wife of a pedestrian against the operator of a street car.
Plaintiff's decedent, while crossing Delmar Boulevard in the daytime, was
struck by a west bound street car, knocked down and rolled or dragged
thirty or forty feet. A verdict and judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed
by the supreme court in an opinion by Judge Barrett. The case was
submitted under the humanitarian doctrine for failure to slacken speed
and failure to warn. The decedent, a pedestrian, was crossing Delmar
Boulevard in the middle of the block. The defendant maintained tvo
street car tracks at the point of crossing. One was an east bound track;
one was a west bound track. The decedent was struck by the west bound
street car. He had passed safely over the west bound track in full view
of the west bound motorman. When he reached the center of the east
bound track, he found himself in the path of an east bound car, became
excited, or panicked, pivoted around to the northwest and walked swiftly
into the path of the west bound car, obviously oblivious of its approach.
There was no opinion evidence concerning the distance in which the
street car could have stopped, but evidence showed it was actually
stopped in 30 to 40 feet after the impact. Upon the basis of the evidence
most favorable to the plaintiff and using actual stopping distance in
lieu of opinion evidence, the court held that the plaintiff made a sub-
missible case of failure to warn and failure to slacken. The case involved
application of established principles to mathematical calculations based
on the testimony and physical facts and circumstantial evidence.
West v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.41 arose out of grade crossing
collision between a pick-up truck and defendant's passenger train in the
daytime in the village of Leasburg. The collision occurred on the main
line track which was eight to ten feet south of a passing track on the
north side, from which direction plaintiff approached. The plaintiff
testified he drove on to the main line track without stopping-that he
continued to look for the passenger train, driving eight to ten miles an
hour, until he reached the passing track, at which point he saw nothing
and shifted into second gear to start across the main line track. Upon
appeal from judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the supreme court in an
opinion by Judge Dalton held that no submissible humanitarian case
was made. It was held that as a matter of law, the plaintiff was not in
40. 295 S.W.2d 37 (Mo. 1956).
41. 295 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1956).
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imminent peril until he reached the passing track and determined to
pass over the main line track. Mathematical calculations indicated that
only one second passed between the time the plaintiff came into imminent
peril and passed into the path of the train. Allowing three-quarters of a
second for reaction time, it was held there was no showing that action
could be taken by the defendant to avoid the collision. The courts then
considered plaintiff's theory that the case was submissible as an "almost
escaping case."' 42 Careful mathematical calculations were made to deter-
mine whether there was a permissible inference that action could have
been taken that would have permitted plaintiff to have passed over the
track and out of the path of the defendant's train. These calculations
show that two to two and a half seconds intervened between the time
peril was discoverable until the collision. Allowing three-quarters of a
second for reaction time, one and a quarter to one -and three-quarters
of a second were available for application of the brakes and slackening
of speed. There was no opinion evidence and no circumstantial evidence
to show that an effective application of the brakes could have been made
in this time. On the issue of ability of the defendant to permit the plain-
tiff to escape by warning, the court pointed out that there was involved
the reaction time of both the trainmen and the plaintiff, as well as the
necessary time for each to act. The opinion is particularly valuable for
its review of the "almost escaping case" in which recovery is permitted.
These cases are distinguished on the facts from the West case.
In Moody v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R.,43 the plaintiff brought an
action for wrongful death of his wife and for damages to his tractor.
Plaintiff's wife was killed when the tractor she was driving was struck
by defendant's train at a private grade crossing on plaintiff's farm in
the daytime. The case was submitted solely on the humanitarian doctrine
for failure to warn and to slacken. In an opinion by Judge Westhues,
the court reaffirmed its* previous holdings that there is no inherent
inconsistency in the submission of a failure to warn and a failure to
slacken. The holding of Kick v. Franklin,44 in which an inconsistency
was found, was again discussed and distinguished by the court. In dispos-
ing of the Kick case, the court used this strong language:
42. Id. at 53.
43. 296 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1956).
44. 117 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1938).
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It is, indeed, difficult to conceive a situation wherein slacken-
ing of speed and sounding a warning would be inconsistent. 4"
This case was an "almost escaping case." The tractor had nearly passed
over the path of the locomotive when it was struck at the rear wheels.
The plaintiff produced definite evidence of the relative speed and move-
ments of the tractor and train but did not depend upon inference from
this lay evidence to make a submissible case of ability to avoid the
collision after the peril of the deceased was discoverable. The plaintiff
produced expert testimony of the length of time the arrival of the train
at the point of impact could be delayed by timely braking of the train.
This is the safest method for the plaintiff in trying an "almost escaping
case." When such evidence is produced, the court and jury are not
required to make the calculations necessary to draw an inference in-
volving intricate calculations and deducations from the available factual
data.
This case was notable in another regard. The crossing in question
was apparently a private crossing with fencing and gates on each side.
The freight train was an extra, not regularly operated at the time.
Although this was a private crossing, the court held there was a duty
to keep a lookout, treating the case as one of "discoverable imminent
peril.146 In holding the case submissible, however, the court also held
that the jury might find that an application of the brakes after the
discovery of the peril would have avoided the collision.
The Moody case was a true humanitarian case-both parties were
negligefitly inattentive or oblivious-but it was also submissible as a
common law last clear chance case of discovered oblivious peril. In view
of the question about applicability of the humanitarian doctrine to
property damage, attention is invited to the fact that plaintiff was
permitted to recover for damage to his tractor, in addition to the fatal
injury of his wife. This is a practice commonly followed but being
challenged frequently on the ground that humanitarian principles were
not devised to protect inanimate property.
Hendershot v. Minich47 was an action for wrongful death of plain-
tiff's eleven year old son. Plaintiff's son was struck and killed by
45. 296 S.W.2d at 54.
46. Id. at 53.
47. 297 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. 1956).
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defendant's passenger car in a daytime collision while riding his bicycle
from a nearby school across a paved highway at the intersection with
a gravel road. The case was submitted to the jury solely upon the humani-
tarian doctrine for failure of the defendant to warn, to stop, to slacken,
and to swerve. The verdict of the jury for the defendant was set aside
by the trial court and a new trial granted for error in giving an instruc-
tion and because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
Defendant's evidence showed that the defendant was aware of the ap-
proach of the deceased on his bicycle thirty-five feet from the two lane
pavement and that the deceased was oblivious of his peril and intent
on proceeding without stopping, into the path of the defendant's car.
Expert evidence as to the ability to stop the defendant's automobile
was offered by plaintiff. The court in an opinion by Judge Eager held
that a submissible case was made for failure to stop, to slacken, to warn,
and possibly upon other grounds. The order granting a new trial was
affirmed.
One of the most important cases decided recently is Sheerin v.
St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co. 48 That case, as pointed out above, severely
restricted the sole cause instruction previously used. Since the Sheerin
case, it is no longer safe to give anything more than a converse instruc-
tion. In the Sheerin case, the plaintiff was a pedestrian under the in-
fluence of intoxicants who walked into the path of a street car obviously
oblivious of his peril. It was an "almost escaping" case. And it was a
true humanitarian case wherein both the plaintiff and the defendant
were negligently inattentive. It was held to be submissible. And the
sole cause instruction, based upon the plaintiff's negligence, was held to
be prejudicially erroneous. This case is an example of the unnecessary
risks in giving a sole cause instruction in a case in which the defendant
has a good chance to win a jury verdict. Until the sole cause instruction
rules are stablized a defendant who has a reasonable chance of securing a
jury verdict should not give such an instruction.
48. 300 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. 1957).
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Wilson v. Toliver49 involved a dual recovery in the trial court on
claim and counterclaim each under the humanitarian rule. The claims
arose out of a nearly head-on collision at a "Y" intersection of two
highways between two motor vehicles travelling at the same speed on
a dry level highway on a bright day with an equally unobstructed view
for each driver. The only unequal factor (and the decisive one) was
that the plaintiff, as he approached the "Y" junction, intended to leave
the highway on which both vehicles were travelling to emerge on the
joining highway by turning left of the center for that purpose. For a quick
mental image of the physical background the exhibits reproduced in the
opinion are helpful.50
After analyzing the evidence, the court concluded that only the
defendant had a submissible case upon the humanitarian rule. Therefore,
the court found it unnecessary to determine whether there may be
simultaneous recoveries by plaintiff and defendant under the rule. The
critical finding of the court is found in this language of the opinion:
"The drivers of the two vehicles involved did not have an equal opportu-
nity to avoid the collision." 51 If the collision in the Wilson case had
occurred on an ordinary highway or at a right angle intersection, an
answer to this question would have been demanded.
52
Opinions may differ on the interpretation of the facts by the court,
but it seems obvious that someday the question of dual recovery will be
presented so that it must be answered, unless legislation intervenes.
Legislation appears unlikely in the present equipoise of political forces,
but this of course may change quickly.
49. 305 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. 1957).
50. Id. at 425.
51. Id. at 431.
52. In this case the simultaneous recoveries were offset by the trial court and
judgment entered for the net amount in favor of the defendant with the larger
recovery. This raises another question. Suppose plaintiff and defendant are well
insured and suffer damages reduced to the same sums by favorable verdicts for each.
The verdicts are offset and neither collects anything. Is this the essence of humanity?
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CONCLUSION
The judges of the supreme court of today have inherited the problem
of the humanitarian doctrine. In its day-to-day administration, they have
greatly improved the quality of the opinions by attention to detail and
by careful and painstaking review of the factual details. Except for the
ebb and flow in the propriety in form of instructions, and except for the
large unanswered questions, the performance of the supreme court in
recent years has been of excellent quality. More stability and unanimity
in ruling on instructions is desirable in this field. But those ends may
not be achieved until the larger questions are answered by the court or
by the legislature.
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